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The explosion of “a massive deportation and detention infrastructure” in recent years has 
spurred a new era of advocacy in immigration law.1 Statutory changes that expand detention and 
deportation while simultaneously restricting judicial review2 have both increased enforcement 
and fundamentally reshaped the immigration field. One major change has been to the 
longstanding existence of habeas jurisdiction to contest the legality of executive detention and 
deportation.3 In 2001, the Supreme Court held that despite statutory changes, habeas jurisdiction 
remained available in two vital contexts: to review legal questions in removal decisions in St. 
Cyr,4 and to “challenge detention that is without statutory authority” in Zadyvdas.5 This essay 
focuses on the latter type of case—challenges to detention—and one tool for bringing those 
challenges on a scale that helps keep pace with the growth of immigration detention: habeas 
class actions.  
Habeas class actions have been an important method for bringing structural reform 
challenges to immigration detention for several decades now,6 but in one that recently made it to 
the Supreme Court—Jennings v. Rodriguez—the Court divided on key questions of jurisdiction 
 
1 See Stephen Manning & Juliet Stumpf, Big Immigration Law, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 412-14 (2018) 
(describing how today’s large-scale immigration enforcement has led to new models of collective representation and 
advocacy).  
2 See generally Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 
Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (hereinafter “IIRIRA”). 
3 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305-06 (2001) (summarizing the historical ability of noncitizens to challenge 
detention and removal through the writ of habeas corpus); Jill Family, Threats to the Future of the Immigration 
Class Action, 27 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 71, 82 (2008) (reviewing congressional restrictions on judicial review of 
immigration).  
4 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 310. 
5 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).  
6 The University of Michigan’s Civil Rights Litigation database returns 31 results since 1981 for immigration 
detention cases in which both habeas relief and class status were sought. CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 
CLEARINGHOUSE, UNIV. MICH., https://www.clearinghouse.net/search.php.  
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and expressed skepticism about whether a class action was appropriate for the relief sought.7 
Similar jurisdictional concerns were echoed by a divided Court the next year in Nielsen v. 
Preap.8 Lower courts have continued certifying habeas classes in the wake of these two cases, 
but they illustrate the difficulties of bringing a successful habeas class action even where it is 
theoretically possible. 
In Part I, I give a brief overview of the history and legal framework of habeas corpus and 
civil immigration detention, along with examples of how habeas class actions have been used to 
challenge elements of each of the major detention schemes. In Part II, I describe some obstacles 
to habeas class actions: statutory restrictions, Rule 23, standing, exhaustion, and mootness, with 
a few examples of habeas classes that have overcome those obstacles or failed to. Part III 
reviews the importance of habeas class actions in immigration, and argues that both habeas and 
class actions should be interpreted expansively as a necessary backstop to arbitrary detention.  
I. Overview and Framework 
a. Historical Background 
The Writ of Habeas Corpus, which stretches back to English common law and is 
enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, is celebrated as one of the great protections of liberty in our 
democratic society.9 It occupies a unique space in legal procedure, encompassing elements of 
“civil, appellate, collateral, equitable, common law, and statutory procedure.”10 Unfortunately, in 
the U.S. today it offers relief to only the smallest fraction of petitioners and has arguably failed 
 
7 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 851 (2018) (the Ninth Circuit to reassess jurisdiction and “whether 
respondents can continue litigating their claims as a class”).  
8 See generally Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019) (dividing over the issue of jurisdiction). 
9 ANTHONY GREGORY, THE POWER OF HABEAS CORPUS IN AMERICA: FROM THE KING’S PREROGATIVE TO THE WAR 
ON TERROR 2 (Cambridge University Press 2013).  
10 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES LIEBMAN, 1 FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2.2 (7th ed., 2018). 
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as a meaningful check on the state’s detention power.11 This has led commentators to suggest 
that for habeas corpus to truly protect individual liberty, it should be dramatically reformed.12  
The idea that habeas class actions “should be welcomed in view of the burden on the 
federal courts resulting from the vast increase in habeas corpus applications” is neither new nor 
surprising in light of the massive scale of incarceration in the U.S.13 Between the 1960s and 
1990s, they were used in the criminal context, as “[h]abeas corpus class action representatives 
sought to litigate common issues on claims that criminal convictions were unconstitutional or 
violated federal law… such as access to counsel in capital cases, access to legal materials, 
disparate sentences for juveniles, and the constitutionality of the death penalty.”14 The 
exhaustion requirements imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA) made joinder in post-conviction habeas cases all but impossible, and the Supreme 
Court in Calderon v. Ashmus held that the Declaratory Judgment Act could not be used to 
challenge an AEDPA provision before the class members had filed habeas petitions and met 
those requirements.15 Although not a habeas class action itself, the reasoning in Calderon 
 
11 GREGORY, supra note 9 at 293-96 (describing how the sheer size of the modern U.S. detention state renders 
habeas as traditionally construed an ineffective remedy for the vast majority of prisoners); Eve Brensike Primus, A 
Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 (2010) (arguing that “federal habeas review of state 
convictions has become a waste of resources while providing almost no real relief, even to deserving petitioners”). 
12 See GREGORY, supra note 9 at 309 (arguing for reconsideration of Tarble’s Case “to restore habeas corpus as it 
once was – a states’ right against federal detention power”); Brensike Primus, supra note 11 at 7 (proposing a model 
in which “a petitioner… would also have to produce some evidence that the violation was systemic rather than an 
idiosyncratic error in his case”).  
13 See Multiparty Federal Habeas Corpus, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1483 (1968) (suggesting habeas class actions 
could reduce the burden of post-conviction petitions on federal courts). 
14 Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 404-05 (2007); see also HERTZ & 
LIEBMAN, supra note 10 at § 11.4, fn. 9 (collecting habeas class action cases). 
15 Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 747-48 (1998) (“[A]ny claim by a prisoner attacking the validity or duration 
of his confinement must be brought under the habeas sections of Title 28…. this means that a state prisoner is 
required to exhaust state remedies before bringing his claim to a federal court. But if respondent Ashmus is allowed 
to maintain the present action, he would obtain a declaration as to the applicable statute of limitations in a federal 
habeas action without ever having shown that he has exhausted state remedies.”). 
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dramatically curtailed class action habeas as a potential method for structural challenges by state 
prisoners, leading one scholar to decry it as “the end of the habeas corpus class action.”16 
But collateral review of criminal convictions is not the only context in which habeas class 
actions can be brought. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 remains a pathway for individuals to challenge 
executive detention, including in the immigration context.17 Just as the large number of post-
conviction habeas petitions is related to the massive size of the U.S. criminal justice system,18 as 
immigration detention has expanded in scope and size over the past several years,19 habeas 
petitions challenging that confinement have increased, as well.20  
Immigration detention is at its most massive level ever. At the end of 2018, ICE was 
holding 47,486 individuals in 215 facilities across the country, about 10% of whom had been 
detained over six months.21 In contrast, the average daily population of immigrant detainees in 
1994 was 6,785.22 Just as the U.S. outpaces the rest of the world in incarceration, it outpaces the 
rest of the world in immigration detention, for example by admitting 323,591 individuals to 
detention in 2017 compared to only 28,978 in the UK that same year.23 Although immigration 
detention is not criminal, “civil detention” is very much a legal fiction.24 Immigrant detainees are 
housed in jails, often alongside criminal inmates, and have their freedom restricted.25 Given the 
 
16 Garrett, supra note 14 at 406. 
17 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2018). 
18 GREGORY, supra note 9 at 294-95.  
19 Emily Ryo, Detained: A Study of Immigration Bond Hearings, 50 L. & SOC’Y REV. 117, 121 (2016) (detailing the 
expansion of immigration detention since the 1980s alongside a rise in “tough on crime” rhetoric). 
20 See Suits Challenging Confinement of Noncitizens Up, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE 
(TRAC) IMMIGRATION (Sept. 20, 2018) (reporting a 98.6% increase in immigration habeas filings between August 
2013 and August 2018). 
21 ICE Focus Shifts Away from Detaining Serious Criminals, TRAC IMMIGRATION 1-2 (June 25, 2019) 
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/564/.  
22 Emily Ryo, Understanding Immigration Detention, 15 ANN. L. & SOC. REV. 97, 101 (2019). 
23 Id. at 99. 
24 Cesar Garcia Hernandez, Abolishing Immigration Prisons, 97 B. U. L. REV. 245, 252-57 (2017) (describing how 
the experience of immigration detention is indistinguishable from criminal punishment). 
25 Id.; Ryo, Understanding Immigration Detention, supra note 22 at 104-05. 
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slow pace of immigration proceedings, an individual who chooses to fight their case may face 
years in jail, not to mention a lower chance of success on the merits.26  
b. Legal Framework of Immigration Detention 
This massive scale of detention is authorized and implemented by statutory provisions of 
the INA, regulations, and Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) case law. There are four main 
statutory provisions that authorize detention: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a), 1226(c), 1225(b), and 
1231(a), and each has its own nuances that have been challenged through habeas class actions. 
The permissive detention statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), allows an immigration judge to 
detain a person pending adjudication of their case, or release them on conditional parole or a 
bond not less than $1,500. 27 The BIA places the burden of proof on the detainee to show that he 
or she is not a danger to society or a flight risk.28 If the detainee fails to meet the burden of 
showing he or she is not a danger, bond is denied.29 The amount is supposed to guarantee future 
appearance in court, but the BIA has stated in multiple unpublished cases that ability to pay is 
irrelevant.30 Whether to grant bond, the amount, and how to weigh the factors are 
discretionary.31 
Multiple aspects of § 1226(a) bond hearings have been challenged through class actions 
seeking habeas relief. For example, immigration judges in the Ninth Circuit are now required to 
 
26 Two interactive datasets from TRAC Immigration allow us to reach this conclusion. Immigration Court 
Processing Time by Outcome, TRAC IMMIGRATION (last visited Nov. 17, 2019) 
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/court_proctime_outcome.php (setting the graph to average 
days for the entire U.S. shows a dramatic rise in processing time, reaching an average of 578 days to resolve a case 
in fiscal year 2018); Details on Deportation Proceedings in Immigration Court, TRAC IMMIGRATION, 
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/ immigration/nta/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2019) (filtering by custody and outcome shows 
that a full 93% of detained individuals since 2001 were ordered removed or accepted voluntary departure, compared 
to only 39% of those who were never detained).   
27 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). This is also referred to as 236(a) detention, after its numeration in the INA.  
28 Matter of Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1113 (B.I.A. 1999). 
29 Matter of Drysdale, 20 I. & N. Dec. 815, 817 (B.I.A. 1994). 
30 See, e.g., Lopez-Ramirez, 2011 Immig. Rptr. LEXIS 6685 (B.I.A. June 27, 2011); Serrano-Cordova, 2009 Immig. 
Rptr. LEXIS 2444 (B.I.A. April 21, 2009). 
31 Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 39 (BIA 2006). 
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consider ability to pay when setting bond as a result of the habeas class action Hernandez v. 
Sessions, which successfully argued that failure to do so led to unconstitutional imprisonment for 
poverty.32 Many courts have found that due process requires the government to bear the burden 
of proof in a § 1226(a) bond hearing,33 including a recent habeas class action, Brito v. Barr.34  
In contrast, under the mandatory detention scheme of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), immigrants 
with certain criminal convictions are detained without bond.35 Mandatory detention began in 
1990,36 but the list of crimes expanded considerably in IIRIRA.37 Section 1226(c) cross-
references the removability and inadmissibility provisions, and includes crimes relating to 
controlled substances,38 a list of “aggravated felonies”—which may not even be felonies,39 and 
“crimes involving moral turpitude.”40 An individual detained under § 1226(c) has the right to an 
initial “Joseph hearing” to contest that classification.41 While § 1226(c) uses the phrase “take 
into custody,”42 the BIA has interpreted that to require detention rather than alternatives like 
 
32 Hernandez v. Lynch, 2016 WL 7116611 (C. D. Cal. 2016) (certifying habeas class) (affirmed by Hernandez v. 
Sessions, 872 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2017)). 
33 See, e.g., Darko v. Sessions, 342 F.Supp.3d 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Diaz-Ceja v. McAleenan, 2019 WL 2774211 
(D. Colo. 2019). 
34 Brito v. Barr, 395 F. Supp. 3d 135 (D. Mass. 2019) (certifying habeas class) (summary judgment granted, Brito v. 
Barr, No. 19-11314-PBS, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206578 (D. Mass. Nov. 27, 2019)).  
35 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). This is also referred to as 236(c) detention, for INA § 236(c). 
36 Immigration Act of 1990, H.R. 101-955 § 504(a)(5), Cong. 101, 2d sess. (Oct. 26, 1990) (amending INA § 236, or 
8 U.S.C. § 1226, by adding a new subsection on mandatory detention). 
37 IIRIRA, supra note 2 at § 303(a) (amending 8 U.S.C. 1226(c) to require mandatory detention for a list of criminal 
inadmissibility or removability grounds). 
38 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2018) (making controlled substances violations grounds for inadmissibility); 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (making controlled substances convictions other than small amounts of marijuana a 
removable offense).  
39 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2018). “Aggravated felony” is in turn defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) and lists 
offenses like theft (G), failure to appear in court (T), and obstruction of justice (S); although whether a conviction is 
an aggravated felony depends on the length of the sentence and the elements of the state law. The list also includes a 
“crime of violence,” which is defined in yet another section of the U.S. Code, part of which was found to be 
unconstitutionally vague in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). 
40 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(I)(i) (making crimes involving moral turpitude grounds for inadmissibility); 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(i-ii) (making crimes involving moral turpitude removable offenses). The term “crime involving moral 
turpitude” is not defined in the INA, and is addressed on a case-by-case basis by applying the categorical approach 
to each given state statute. See, e.g., Diaz-Lizarraga 26 I. & N. Dec. 847, 852 (B.I.A. 2016) (“updat[ing]” its prior 
caselaw to define a state shoplifting statute as a crime involving moral turpitude).   
41 Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 805 (B.I.A. 1999). 
42 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). 
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electronic monitoring.43 Thus, an individual may be detained under this provision for years while 
his or her case moves through immigration court, resulting in an extended loss of liberty.44  
The facial constitutionality of mandatory detention was upheld by the Supreme Court in 
Demore v. Kim,45 but multiple circuits have determined that Due Process requires reading an 
implicit reasonableness requirement into § 1226(c) making detention unconstitutional when 
“prolonged.”46 One such case, which set a bright-line rule requiring a bond hearing following six 
months of prolonged detention in the Ninth Circuit, was the habeas class action that reached the 
Supreme Court as Jennings v. Rodriguez.47 Two habeas classes that reached the Supreme Court a 
year later as Nielsen v. Preap challenged the government’s application of § 1226(c) to 
individuals who had been released from criminal custody—sometimes years earlier—before 
being detained by ICE, on the basis that § 1226(c) only requires the Secretary to take those 
individuals into custody “when the alien is released.”48 The Court rejected that argument on the 
merits, but splintered on the questions of jurisdiction for judicial review and mootness.49  
 
43 Aguilar-Aquino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 747, 752 (B.I.A. 2009). See also Philip L. Torrey, Rethinking Immigration's 
Mandatory Detention Regime: Politics, Profit, and the Meaning of “Custody”, 48 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 879, 907-
10 (2015) (criticizing Aguilar-Aquino and arguing that “custody” should be interpreted more broadly). This 
interpretation contradicts much of the current habeas jurisprudence, which has interpreted custody to include 
restrictions on liberty like probation or bail. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 10 at § 8.2(d) (collecting cases 
defining “custody” for the purposes of habeas jurisdiction).  
44 Fatma E. Marouf, Alternatives to Immigration Detention, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 2141, 2147-48 (2017) (describing 
mandatory detention and its impact on individuals pursuing relief). 
45 Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 530 (2003). Demore was a habeas case, though not a class action. See 
also Alex Sirota, Note: Locked Up: Demore, Mandatory Detention, and the Fifth Amendment, 74 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 2337, 2366-70 (criticizing the Demore decision). 
46 After Demore, a split arose between circuits that required a case-by-case determination of when detention became 
“unreasonable,” and those that set a bright-line rule of six months after which detention became presumptively 
unreasonable. Sirota, supra note 45; compare Sopo v. Attorney General, 825 F.3d 1199, 1215 (11th Cir. 2016); Reid 
v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 497 (1st Cir. 2016); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir. 2011); 
Hoang Minh Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 273 (6th Cir. 2003) (adopting a fact-specific analysis); with Rodriguez v. 
Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013); Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 606 (2d Cir. 2015) (adopting a 
bright-line rule of six months). 
47 Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d at 1138. 
48 Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 964 (2019). 
49 See id. at 962-63 (finding jurisdiction to review in the plurality section of the opinion). 
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If an arriving immigrant is inadmissible, he or she is known as an “arriving alien” and is 
subject to expedited removal without a hearing.50 However, if he or she indicates a fear of 
persecution, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) states that he or she “shall be detained pending a final 
determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until 
removed.”51 If found to have a credible fear, a person may be paroled into the U.S.52 or “shall be 
detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.”53 For years, individuals who 
passed a credible fear interview and were transferred to removal proceedings were eligible for 
bond,54 but over the summer, Attorney General Barr set a new precedent that they are instead 
subject to mandatory detention as long as their asylum proceedings last.55 That interpretation was 
challenged—and enjoined—by a nation-wide habeas class action in Padilla v. ICE.56 
The final type of detention is 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which covers individuals subject to final 
removal orders.57 It begins when a removal order becomes administratively final, and allows the 
 
50 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Despite the broad language in § 1225(b), case law recognizes a distinction between 
permanent residents returning from a brief trip abroad and arriving aliens with no status. Compare Landon v. 
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (holding that a legal permanent resident returning from a brief trip is entitled to 
due process in exclusion proceedings) with Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) 
(holding that the executive’s decision to exclude an arriving alien was unreviewable). Either way, the right to due 
process in admission proceedings is distinct from the right to be free from arbitrary detention while those 
proceedings take place. PRACTICE ADVISORY: PROLONGED DETENTION CHALLENGES AFTER JENNINGS V. RODRIGUEZ 
15-16, ACLU (March 21, 2018) https://www.aclu.org/other/ practice-advisory-prolonged-detention-challenges-after-
jennings-v-rodriguez.  
51 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).  
52 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). A recent class action, though not a habeas petition, received a preliminary injunction 
requiring five ICE Field Offices to comply with its own internal directive when parole grant rates suddenly dropped 
from over 90% to nearly 0% following a change in administration. Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317 (D.D.C. 
2018).  
53 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).  
54 See In re X- K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 731, 736 (B.I.A. May 4, 2005) (“[T]hose provisions do not expressly alter the 
jurisdiction conferred by the regulations on Immigration Judges to redetermine the custody status of aliens in 
removal proceedings.”). 
55 See In re M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509, 509 (B.I.A. April 16, 2019) (“There is no way to apply those provisions 
except as they were written--unless paroled, an alien must be detained until his asylum claim is adjudicated.”). 
56 See Padilla v. ICE, 387 F.Supp.3d 1219, 1229 (W.D. Wash., July 2, 2019) (modifying a prior preliminary 
injunction to enjoin the new interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii)), stay of preliminary injunction lifted in 
relevant part, Padilla v. ICE, No. 19-35565, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 21846 (9th Cir. July 22, 2019). 
57 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). 
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government to detain someone for 90 days to effectuate deportation.58 The removal of detainees 
to countries that lacked a functioning government to accept them was challenged under this 
statute through early habeas class actions, but ultimately that challenge was rejected on the 
merits.59 If removal is not possible in 90 days, the individual may be released under 
supervision,60 or may continue to be held if they are “a risk to the community or unlikely to 
comply with the order of removal.”61 DHS initially took the position that it could detain 
individuals indefinitely under this provision, but the Supreme Court held that detention under § 
1231(a)(6) was presumptively reasonable for only six months, and that “once removal is no 
longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute” in 
Zadvydas v. Davis.62  
This section also covers individuals who have been deported and returned to the 
country.63 Instead they are subject to “reinstatement” of the original removal order, with no 
opportunity to apply for relief unless they can show a reasonable fear of torture to qualify for 
withholding of removal, a form of relief similar to asylum with a higher evidentiary threshold.64 
Whether an individual whose fear is found reasonable is subject to mandatory detention under § 
1231(a)(6) or is entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a) during withholding-only proceedings 
is currently a circuit split, but all the courts to address it have determined that either statutory 
 
58 Id. 
59 See Ali v. Ashcroft, 213 F.R.D. 390, 396 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (seeking to enjoin detention and deportation of a 
class of Somalis who could not be deported because there was no functioning government of Somalia to accept 
them). This decision was vacated following the Supreme Court’s decision in Jama v. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (2005), which held that § 1231(b) did not require consent from the country of removal. 
Ali v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 795, 796 (9th Cir. 2005) (vacating and remanding to reconsider class certification). 
60 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3). 
61 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). 
62 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699, 701 (2001). Zadvydas was a consolidation of two habeas cases, in one of 
which the district court considered “about 100 similar cases together [and] issued a joint order.” Id. at 686. 
63 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).  
64 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). 
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scheme requires a bond hearing following prolonged detention.65 Recently, the Eastern District 
of Virginia certified, and granted summary judgment to, a habeas class of immigrants in 
withholding-only proceedings, entitling them to an individualized bond hearing.66 Two more 
habeas class actions currently being litigated in the Ninth Circuit argue that due process entitles § 
1231(a)(6) detainees to a bond hearing following six months of detention.67  
Jennings v. Rodriguez was a habeas class action that challenged prolonged detention for 
four subclasses of individuals held under each of these provisions.68 The Ninth Circuit had held 
that each of the statutes implicitly required bond hearings after six months of detention to avoid 
an unconstitutional reading of those provisions.69 That statutory interpretation was overturned by 
the Supreme Court, but the Court remanded to consider the constitutional issue.70 In addition, the 
Court directed the Ninth Circuit to redetermine whether the class was appropriately certified and 
whether there was continuing jurisdiction now that the statutory claim had been rejected.71 
II. Potential Obstacles in Habeas Class Actions 
While habeas class actions have been and continue to be creatively used to challenge 
various aspects of the immigration detention scheme described above, there are major obstacles 
to bringing a habeas class action in the immigration context. Lower courts have struggled with 
 
65 Compare Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 862 F.3d 881, 886 (9th Cir. 2017) and Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden of York 
County Prison, 905 F.3d 208, 219 (3d Cir. 2018) (determining that detention during withholding-only proceedings is 
governed by § 1231(a)(6)) with Guerra v. Shanahan, 831 F.3d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 2016) and Chavez v. Hott, 940 F.3d 
867, 882 (4th Cir. 2019) (determining that § 1226(a) governs the detention of individuals withholding-only 
proceedings). 
66 Cabrera Diaz v. Hott, 297 F. Supp. 3d 618, 626 (E.D. Va. 2018) (affirmed by Chavez v. Hott, 940 F.3d 867 (4th 
Cir. 2019)). 
67 See Aleman-Gonzalez v. Sessions, 325 F.R.D. 616, 629 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (certifying class and granting 
preliminary injunction) (appeal docketed, Aleman-Gonzalez v. Barr, 18-16465 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2018)); Martinez-
Baños v. Asher, 2018 WL 3244988 at *5 (W.D. Wash. July 23, 2018) (report and recommendation adopted by 
Martinez-Baños v. Asher, 2018 WL 1617706, Apr. 4, 2018) (appeal docketed, Martinez-Baños v. Godfrey, 18-
35460 (9th Cir. May 31, 2019)). 
68 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 838-39. 
69 Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d at 1138. 
70 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 843.  
71 Id. at 851-52. 
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these obstacles for years, but especially after Jennings.72 The largest obstacles are statutory 
restrictions on judicial review imposed by IIRIRA73 and the REAL ID Act.74 Three clauses are 
particularly relevant to habeas class actions: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9), 1252(f)(1), and 1226(e). In 
addition, standing, mootness, and exhaustion are ever-present obstacles. Finally, Rule 23 is a 
hurdle, and whether a class can be certified will generally depend on the legal question raised. 
These obstacles, with examples of how courts have addressed them, are each discussed below. 
a. Consolidation of questions for judicial review: 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) requires that “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact, 
including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from 
any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this 
title” only be reviewable on review of a final order, and strips jurisdiction under any other 
provision, including § 2241.75 This provision was most recently amended in the REAL ID Act of 
2005,76 to specifically reference § 2241 after the Supreme Court’s decision in St. Cyr.77 Read 
broadly, it would mean no habeas petition could be filed except with a petition for review of a 
final order of removal, making detention pending that final order essentially unreviewable.78  
 
72 See Aditi Shah, Class Actions and Due Process Relief for Immigration Detainees After Jennings v. Rodriguez, 
LAWFARE INSTITUTE (Oct. 29, 2019) https://www.lawfareblog.com/class-actions-and-due-process-relief-
immigration-detainees-after-jennings-v-rodriguez (describing differing analyses of class action certification in the 
lower courts following Jennings). 
73 See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in Immigration Law, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1661 (2000) 
(summarizing potential federal courts issues following IIRIRA). 
74 See Castellar v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-0491-BAS-BGS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21174 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2018) at 
*52-54 (unpublished) (discussing the legislative history of the REAL ID Act Amendments to the INA). 
75 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). 
76 See The REAL ID Act, 109 Pub. L. 13, 119 Stat. 231, Subpart B, § 106(a)(1)(A)(iii) (109th Cong. 2005) 
(inserting subsection (b)(9) to § 1252). 
77 Family, supra note 3 at 84. 
78 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 840. 
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This was the provision that led to the split of the plurality and concurrence in Jennings,79 
and again divided the court in Preap.80 In Jennings, the justices disagreed on whether review of 
the legal question—whether bond hearings were required following six months of prolonged 
detention—was foreclosed by § 1252(b)(9) because that detention could be considered “arising 
from” a “proceeding brought to remove an alien.”81 The plurality chose to interpret “arising 
from” narrowly.82 It listed types of claims such as Bivens actions or state torts that might 
conceivably “arise from” detention, and concluded that “cramming judicial review of those 
questions into review of final removal orders would be absurd” and “would also make claims of 
prolonged detention effectively unreviewable.”83 The concurrence disagreed, and thought that 
“no court has jurisdiction over this case.”84 The concurrence then considered whether this 
restriction violated the Suspension Clause, but instead decided that the suit was not truly a 
habeas petition.85 Despite the disagreement, neither party in Jennings had even raised § 
1252(b)(9) before the Supreme Court.86 The Court divided along the exact same lines a year later 
in Preap, which addressed the statutory scope of mandatory detention, with both the plurality 
and concurrence reiterating their arguments in Jennings.87  
 
79 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 840, 852.  
80 Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 840. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 852. 
85 Id. at 858. 
86 See id. at 841 (“The parties in this case have not addressed the scope of § 1252(b)(9), and it is not necessary for us 
to attempt to provide a comprehensive interpretation.”); id. at 853 (“Although neither party raises § 1252(b)(9), this 
Court has an ‘independent obligation’ to assess whether it deprives us and the lower courts of jurisdiction.”) 
(Thomas, J., concurring).  
87 See Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. at 958-59 (describing the legal question); id. at 962 (referencing the earlier 
reasoning in Jennings for why § 1252(b)(9) did not apply) (Alito, J., writing for the plurality); id. at 974 (referencing 
earlier concurrence in Jennings for why no court has jurisdiction) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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On remand, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the plurality about its own jurisdiction, before 
remanding the class certification question and constitutional question to the district court.88 
When discussing § 1252(b)(9), it quoted the plurality’s language that petitioners were “not 
asking for review of an order of removal; [] not challenging the decision to detain them in the 
first place or to seek removal; and [] not even challenging any part of the process by which their 
removability will be determined”— only their indefinite detention during that process.89  
Since then, other lower courts have relied on the plurality’s analysis to determine when § 
1252(b)(9) applies. The district court in Alvarez v. Sessions found it lacked jurisdiction over a 
habeas petition90 asserting that the transfer of petitioners between detention facilities interfered 
with their right to access counsel.91 The court discussed Jennings and determined that 
“‘cramming’ issues related to legal representation during removal proceedings into the [Petition 
for Review] process neither creates an absurdity in the way contemplated by the Supreme Court 
in Jennings, nor places those decisions outside of meaningful judicial review.”92 
Similarly, the putative habeas class action Cancino-Castellar v. Nielsen alleged that the 
government’s practice of unnecessary delay in detaining immigrants prior to their first hearing 
violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.93 The district court had initially dismissed those 
claims for a lack of jurisdiction under § 1252(b)(9), determining that the delay “cannot be 
extricated from the removal proceedings,” and rejecting the argument that challenges to 
 
88 Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 255-56 (9th Cir. 2018). 
89 Id. at 256. 
90 This particular habeas petition included ten petitioners, but did not seek class certification. Alvarez v. Sessions, 
338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
91 Id. at 1045. 
92 Id. at 1049. But see Singh v. Gonzalez, 499 F.3d 969, 972 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding, pre-Jennings, that “a narrow 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a post-administrative filing of an appeal with the court 
of appeals… falls outside the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the REAL ID Act”). 
93 Cancino-Castellar v. Nielsen, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1107 (S.D. Cal. 2018). 
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detention were categorically outside the scope of § 1252(b)(9).94 However, it reconsidered 
following Jennings. The district court determined that the clause continued to bar jurisdiction 
over the Fourth Amendment claim that the petitioners were being detained prior to the hearing 
without probable cause, because that claim was “challenging the decision to detain them in the 
first place,” which the plurality suggested would fall under § 1252(b)(9).95 But it reinstated the 
petitioners’ Fifth Amendment claim challenging the delay in providing an initial hearing because 
that delay was not a part of the removal process, and like the prolonged detention claims in 
Jennings, would be “effectively unreviewable” on a petition for review.96  
b. (Possible) limit on class-wide injunctive relief: 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) 
Another provision of IIRIRA, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), limits class-wide injunctive relief. It 
reads, “[N]o court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or 
restrain the operation of the provisions of [this chapter] other than with respect to the application 
of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such chapter have 
been initiated.”97 Legislative history suggests this clause was intended to prevent broad 
injunctions that would prevent the new system from taking effect.98 Early cases discussing this 
provision lent support to the idea that courts could enjoin an unlawful interpretation of the 
 
94 Castellar v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-0491-BAS-BGS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21174 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2018) at *40, 
51-52. 
95 Cancino-Castellar v. Nielsen, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 1115 (citing Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841). The district court also 
discussed how the plurality differed from prior Ninth Circuit law on § 1252(b)(9), and described the relevant 
question as no longer whether a claim was “inextricably linked” or “collateral” to removal proceedings, but rather 
“whether the claims otherwise challenge issues that are cognizable in the [Petition for Review] process.” Id. at 1114.  
96 Id. at 1117 (citing Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 840). 
97 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1). 
98 See Jill Family, Another Limit on Federal Court Jurisdiction? Immigrant Access to Class-Wide Injunctive Relief, 
53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 11, 31-32 (2006) (discussing the House Committee Report, H.R. Rep. No. 104-469 (I) at 161 
(1996), which reads: “These limitations do not preclude challenges to the new procedures, but the procedures will 
remain in force while such lawsuits are pending. In addition, courts may issue injunctive relief pertaining to the case 
of an individual alien, and thus protect against any immediate violation of rights. However, single district courts or 
courts of appeal do not have authority to enjoin procedures established by Congress to reform the process of 
removing illegal aliens from the U.S.”). 
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statutes on a class-wide basis, but that a determination of whether the law itself should be 
enjoined could only be made for individually affected petitioners, or by the Supreme Court.99  
This was the argument that the Ninth Circuit relied on in the lead-up to Jennings, stating 
that § 1252(f)(1) “prohibits only injunction of ‘the operation of’ the detention statutes, not 
injunction of a violation of the statutes.”100 The Supreme Court appeared to agree, as it did not 
discuss § 1252(f)(1) as an obstacle to its own review, but directed the Ninth Circuit on remand to 
consider whether it could still offer injunctive relief now that the statutory basis for the 
injunction had been overruled, and if not, whether declaratory relief could sustain the class.101  
On remand, the Ninth Circuit concluded it had jurisdiction despite § 1252(f)(1) at 
minimum to enter declaratory relief, and because “[a]ll of the individuals in the putative class are 
‘individual[s] against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated’ and are pursuing 
habeas claims, albeit as a class…. Section 1252(f)(1) also does not bar the habeas class action 
because it lacks a clear statement repealing the court's habeas jurisdiction.” 102 The Padilla v. 
ICE court soon followed this lead and found it had jurisdiction despite § 1252(f)(1) because the 
class was a collection of individuals already in removal proceedings, and because this was not a 
regular class action, but a habeas petition.103 Specifically, it reasoned that “[t]here is nothing… to 
indicate that, absent a specific restriction, this Court is not authorized to exercise the full panoply of 
its habeas powers, including its equitable powers to enjoin conduct found unconstitutional.”104  
This same interpretation failed in Hamama v. Homan, in which the Sixth Circuit found 
that while the district court had jurisdiction over the class’s prolonged detention claims, it could 
 
99 Id. at 29-30 (collecting early cases).  
100 Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010). 
101 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 851.  
102 Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d at 256-57. 
103 Order on Motions re: Preliminary Injunction, Padilla v. ICE, 387 F. Supp. 3d 1219, 1226 (W.D. Wash. 2019). 
104 The district court also made a point of rejecting the adverse reasoning in Hamama, discussed infra. Id.  
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not enter injunctive relief because of § 1252(f)(1).105 The petitioners there also argued that the 
statute didn’t expressly prohibit class certification, and its reference to “an . . . alien . . . against 
whom proceedings under such part have been initiated” was intended as a carveout, making § 
1252(f)(1) inapplicable if the entire certified class was already in immigration proceedings.106 
But the Sixth Circuit noted, “there is a big difference between barring the certification of a class 
under Rule 23 and barring all injunctive relief. The former bars a class action regarding anything; 
the latter only bars injunctive relief for anyone other than individuals.”107 It also rejected the 
argument that § 1252(f)(1) suspended the writ of habeas, since § 1252(f)(1) doesn’t preclude 
traditional habeas relief or injunctive habeas relief for individuals.108 
Regardless of the disagreement, the carveout argument for why § 1252(f)(1) should not 
apply to a given habeas class is fortunately not always necessary. First of all, class-wide 
declaratory relief will often be a sufficient remedy and is still available by the plain terms of § 
1252(f)(1), which the Supreme Court plurality in Preap recognized the next year.109 Moreover, 
the argument that § 1252(f)(1) doesn’t prohibit injunctive relief restraining the unlawful 
interpretation of a statute still applies to a range of cases challenging interpretations and 
regulations. For example, in Brito, the court held that § 1252(f)(1) didn’t apply because 
petitioners were requesting an injunction against agency regulations implementing the statute, 
 
105 Hamama v. Homan, 912 F.3d 869, 877 (6th Cir. 2018), rehearing denied, Hamama v. Adducci, No. 17-2171/18-
1233, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 9708 (6th Cir. Apr. 2, 2019). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 878. 
108 Id. at 879. The petitioners in Hamama also raised the argument that their request for bond hearings following 
prolonged detention would not “enjoin or restrain the operations” of the detention statutes, but rather ensure that 
those statutes were being correctly implemented. The Sixth Circuit rejected that argument, concluding Jennings had 
foreclosed the possibility of any such statutory requirement, and went on to say that requiring bond hearings for 
prolonged detention was a restraint on the operation of the statute. Still, reasonable minds can differ as to whether 
forcing the government to justify prolonged, rather than initial, detention is truly a restriction on the operation of a 
statute. Id. at 879-80. 
109 Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. at 962. (“Whether the [district] court had jurisdiction to enter such an injunction is 
irrelevant because the District Court had jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief, and for 
independent reasons given below, we are ordering the dissolution of the injunction that the District Court ordered.”).  
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not the statute itself.110 The court then issued an injunction requiring the government to bear the 
burden of proof in § 1226(a) bond hearings, which had been established by BIA precedent but 
not mandated by statute.111 
c. Non-reviewability of discretionary decisions: 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) 
A final provision that presents a potential limit to habeas class actions is 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(e), which states that “The Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the 
application of this section shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action or 
decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention or release of any 
alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.”112 The Supreme Court has clearly 
held, however, that this provision “does not preclude ‘challenges [to] the statutory framework 
that permits [the alien’s] detention without bail.”113 In other words, § 1226(e) does not bar 
habeas class actions challenging the decision-making process rather than the actual decision. For 
example, in Hernandez, a habeas class challenged immigration judges’ refusal to consider ability 
to pay in setting bond.114 Though bond amount is discretionary, the court found that § 1226(e) 
did not bar review where the petitioner was challenging the constitutionality of the process—and 
its failure to include a certain discretionary factor—rather than its application.115 This has 
continued to be the case after Jennings, including in the Ninth Circuit’s decision on remand.116  
 
110 See Brito v. Barr, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 146 (“In any event, § 1252(f)(1) strips courts of jurisdiction to enjoin the 
operation of the statute, not any agency regulation or precedent….”). 
111 Id. 
112 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). 
113 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 841 (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. at 517); Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. at 
962. 
114 Hernandez v. Lynch, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191881 at *33-34. 
115 Id. 
116 Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d at 256; see also Rivera v. Holder, 307 F.R.D. 539, 546 (W.D. Wash. 2015) 
(“While an IJ's discretionary judgment in how it applies the statute is not subject to review, this Court has found no 
authority supporting the notion that an IJ has the discretion to misinterpret the statute under which he operates.”). A 
similar statute foreclosing judicial review of discretionary parole decisions, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), was found 
not to be an obstacle to jurisdiction for the class of asylum seekers who challenged not the denial of parole, but the 
de facto denial of an individualized determination. Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 327.  
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d. Standing, Mootness, and Exhaustion 
Standing has not been a major obstacle to class habeas petitions in the immigration 
context before or after Jennings. In fact, Jennings did not even mention standing at all.117 One 
way it occasionally arises in the lower courts, though, is when the injury is purely procedural, 
such as in discretionary bond hearings under § 1226(a). For instance, in Rivera v. Holder, the 
government argued that the petitioners were not injured by the immigration judge’s refusal to 
consider release on conditional parole instead of bond.118 The court determined that the 
inadequate bond hearing was a procedural injury, for which the named petitioner only needed to 
show “(a) that she has a procedural right that, if exercised, ‘could’ protect her concrete interests 
and (b) that those interests fall within the zone of interests protected by the statute at issue.”119 It 
had no trouble finding that the petitioner had an interest in an adequate bond hearing and 
standing to challenge the defects in that hearing even before her detention became prolonged.120  
In contrast, mootness often presents a more difficult obstacle due to the very nature of 
immigration detention. Individual immigration habeas claims are susceptible to being dismissed 
as moot if the petitioner is either released, granted immigration relief, or deported before the 
habeas petition is resolved.121 When ruling on class certification, though, courts have held that 
the named petitioner’s release on bond does not moot a claim if the government had the ability to 
 
117 See generally Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830.  
118 Rivera v. Holder, 307 F.R.D. 539, 543 (W.D. Wash. 2015). 
119 Id. at 545. 
120 Id. at 548. 
121 See, e.g., Chen v. Lowe, No. 4:18-CV-1951, 2018 BL 409996 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 06, 2018) (dismissing a habeas 
petition as moot because petitioner had been released under an order of supervision); Pierre v. Dep’t Homeland 
Security, No. 3:18-CV-2302, 2019 BL 75885 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 07, 2019) (report and recommendation adopted, No. 
3:18-CV-2302, 2019 BL 74910 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 05, 2019)) (dismissing a habeas case as moot because the petitioner 
had been deported). 
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revoke that bond and refused to “unconditionally assert that Plaintiffs will not be re-detained”122 
or if the release imposes conditions of supervision such as electronic monitoring.123  
Even where the named plaintiff’s claim is definitely mooted before certification, such as 
after being unconditionally released following a grant of immigration relief, courts have been 
permissive in certifying classes under the “inherently transitory” exception.124 As the district 
court explained in Hernandez, this exception is grounded in the “capable of repetition yet 
evading review” exception to mootness, and allows a class to be certified even if a claim 
becomes moot before certification if other class members will have the same problem and the 
trial court likely could not rule on the motion before any such claim expired.125 This exception 
fits most immigration detention claims, “given the Government's ability to end the allegedly 
unconstitutional detention of an alien through removal or release” in these cases.126  
The Supreme Court blessed both these lines of reasoning in the Preap plurality. When the 
two habeas classes were certified below, all the named plaintiffs had been released, but the Court 
held that mootness was not an obstacle because at least “one named plaintiff in both cases had 
obtained release on bond, as opposed to [immigration relief], and that release had been granted 
following a preliminary injunction…. Unless that preliminary injunction was made permanent 
and was not disturbed on appeal, these individuals faced the threat of re-arrest and mandatory 
detention.”127 The Court went further, though, and noted that even if there had not been a live 
claim, the inherently transitory exception would have applied.128  
 
122 Padilla v. ICE, 387 F. Supp. 3d at 1225. 
123 Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d at 1118 (9th Cir. 2010). 
124 See, e.g., Brito v. Barr, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 146; Padilla v. ICE, 387 F. Supp. 3d at 1225. 
125 Hernandez v. Lynch, No. EDCV 16-00620-JGB (KKx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191881 at *39 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 
10, 2016) aff’d by Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 19021 (9th Cir. Cal., Oct. 2, 2017).  
126 Brito v. Barr, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 146. 
127 Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. at 963. 
128 Id. 
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e. Exhaustion of administrative remedies 
28 U.S.C. § 2241 does not require exhaustion as a statutory matter.129 Although some 
provisions of the INA require exhaustion for review of a removal order, exhaustion is only 
prudential for habeas petitions challenging detention apart from the merits of removal.130 
Exhaustion requires appeal to the BIA,131 but this necessarily prolongs detention, and may make 
habeas review impossible if the BIA is slower than the parallel immigration proceedings. 
While the exact standard for when exhaustion is prudentially required varies by circuit, 
there are several widely applied exceptions.132 One of the most important is futility, which 
applies where the agency lacks the power to redress the issue, or has already addressed the issue 
and shows no indication that it intends to reconsider.133 Courts have waived exhaustion as futile 
even where the BIA could theoretically alter its policy if previous decisions indicate that it had 
already made up its mind.134 For example, in Hernandez, the court agreed that exhaustion would 
have been futile in challenging the immigration judge’s refusal to consider ability to pay because 
 
129 28 U.S.C. § 2241; see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 793 (2008) (addressing exhaustion under § 2241 
as a prudential doctrine) 
130 See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, 2 FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 42.2 (2019) (discussing 
exhaustion in immigration cases); El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Exec. Office of Immigration Review, 959 F.2d 
742, 746 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[E]xhaustion of administrative remedies is statutorily required only if appellees are 
seeking to attack a final order of deportation or exclusion. We have joined a number of other circuits in drawing a 
distinction between jurisdiction to rule on the merits of an individual deportation order and jurisdiction to rule on an 
alleged pattern and practice of constitutional or statutory violations.”).   
131 Yan Lan Wu v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Where an immigration petitioner makes some effort 
to put the Board on notice of an issue being raised on appeal, he or she may be deemed to have exhausted his or her 
remedies.”).  
132 See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 130 (listing exceptions for failure to exhaust such as “where exhaustion 
would be futile… or where the agency or some other governmental official has interfered with the petitioner’s 
ability to make effective use of the administrative or other remedy; or where the petitioner cannot practicably utilize 
the remedy because of the imminence of removal or some other harm; or…. utilization of the administrative 
procedure would serve no useful purpose; or where strict application… would result in a ‘manifest injustice.’”). 
133 See, e.g., Rivera v. Holder, 307 F.R.D. at 552.  
134 See, e.g., Order granting certification, Padilla v. United States ICE, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36473 at *14 (W.D. 
Wash. 2019) (“[W]here a defendant's policies are immutable, a futile effort at administrative exhaustion is not 
required.”); Cox v. Monica, 2007 WL 1804335 at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (accepting that appeal of classification under § 
1226(c) would have been futile based on unpublished BIA cases that suggested the BIA had “predetermined the 
issue before it”).   
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“in several unpublished cases the BIA has concluded that an alien's ability to pay the bond 
amount is not a relevant bond determination factor.”135 Similarly, in Rivera, the court found 
unpublished BIA decisions and the EOIR handbook sufficient evidence that exhaustion would be 
futile on the issue of whether immigration judges must consider conditional parole.136  
f. Rule 23 
Despite the skepticism of the Jennings concurrence about whether “habeas relief can be 
pursued in a class action,”137 the Supreme Court has reviewed other habeas class action cases, 
including Preap, without appearing too concerned.138 However, it is not obvious that Rule 23 
even applies to habeas. The Conformity Clause of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states 
that the rules—such as Rule 23— are applicable “to proceedings for habeas corpus … to the 
extent that the practice in those proceedings: (A) is not specified in a federal statute, the Rules 
Governing Section 2254 Cases, or the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases; and (B) has 
previously conformed to the practice in civil actions.”139 The Supreme Court declined to apply 
another civil rule (interrogatories) to habeas because habeas practice had not conformed to that 
practice when the Rules were enacted.140 Although habeas practice did not include multiparty 
actions when Rule 23 was enacted, courts have the power to utilize a similar procedure and rely 
on Rule 23 by analogy when certifying habeas classes.141 As the Ninth Circuit explained when 
 
135 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d at 989. But see Paz Nativi v. Shanahan, 1:16-cv-08496 at *4 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 23, 
2017) (dismissing an individual habeas claim petition raising ability to pay for failure to exhaust because the BIA 
had no binding precedent on the issue). 
136 Rivera v. Holder, 307 F.R.D. at 552. 
137 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 858, fn. 7 (“This Court has never addressed whether habeas relief can be 
pursued in a class action. I take no position on that issue here....”) (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citations 
omitted). 
138 See, e.g., Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954; United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 100 S. Ct. 
1202 (1980) (discussing how mootness affected review of a denial of class certification of a habeas petition). 
139 Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 81(a)(4). 
140 Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 294 (1969). 
141 See United States ex. rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1125-26 (2d Cir. 1974) (determining that Rule 23 does 
not govern habeas actions, but allowing a “multi-party proceeding similar to the class action” anyway); Bijeol v. 
Benson, 513 F.2d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 1975) (agreeing that “a representative procedure analogous to the class action 
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affirming the certification of a habeas class in Ali v. Ashcroft, “although Rule 23 might be 
‘technically inapplicable to habeas corpus proceedings,’ the courts have ‘applied an analogous 
procedure by reference to Rule 23.’”142  
Even as district courts apply the requirements of Rule 23 to habeas classes, it is not clear 
whether those requirements are a ceiling or a floor.143 The majority in Jennings implied that Rule 
23, and the required level of analysis under it, applies to habeas by instructing the lower court to 
reconsider whether a class action continued to be appropriate to litigate fact-specific due process 
claims in light of Dukes.144 District courts appear to apply the exact same analysis when 
certifying habeas classes as for any other certification under Rule 23, though.  
The first requirement of 23(a), numerosity, is not generally contested in the immigration 
detention context.145 In Abdi v. Duke, the court found that numerosity was satisfied for a 
proposed class of asylum seekers who had passed a credible fear interview and been detained at a 
certain detention center for over six months even though the petitioners could only identify 28 
class members.146 It reasoned that the situation was analogous to class actions in prison litigation 
 
provided for in Rule 23 may be appropriate in a habeas corpus action under some circumstances”); HERTZ & 
LIEBMAN, supra note 10 at § 11.4, fn 9 (providing examples of habeas class actions). But see Belgrave v. Greene, 
2000 US Dist. LEXIS 18648 at *15-16 (D. Colo. 2000) (determining that while a Rule 23-style multi-party action 
was possible, it would be inappropriate in those circumstances). 
142 Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873, 891 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Napier v. Gertrude, 542 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1976)) 
(opinion withdrawn on other grounds by Ali v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also Rodriguez v. 
Hayes, 591 F.3d at 1117 (9th Cir. 2010) (“While ‘ordinarily disfavored,’ the Ninth Circuit has recognized that class 
actions may be brought pursuant to habeas corpus.”). 
143 Compare Bertrand v. Sava, 535 F. Supp. 1020, 1025 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“[M]ore stringent standards of 
commonality may apply to group habeas actions.”) with Bijeol v. Benson, 513 F.2d at 968 (“[W]e need not decide 
whether the District Court complied with the precise provisions of Rule 23 [, which] are not applicable to these 
proceedings.”) (internal citations omitted).  
144 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 851-52. 
145 See, e.g., Order granting certification of the classes, Padilla v. United States Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36473 at *6 (“Defendants do not challenge this element, and the Court finds 
that the requirement for numerosity has been satisfied.”); Cabrera Diaz v. Hott, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 626 
(“Respondents do not challenge petitioners' ability to satisfy the numerosity and adequacy requirements”); Brito v. 
Barr, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 144 (“apparently conceding that the numerosity and adequacy of class counsel requirements 
are met…”). 
146 Abdi v. Duke, 323 F.R.D. 131, 140 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (decertified on other grounds, Abdi v. McAleenan, No. 
1:17-cv-00721 EAW, 2019 WL 4621898 (W.D.N.Y. Sep. 24, 2019)). 
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in that “the fluid composition of a prison population is particularly well-suited for class status, 
because, although the identity of the individuals involved may change, the nature of the wrong 
and the basic parameters of the group affected remain constant.”147  
Adequacy is likewise not usually a highly contested issue, and usually arises when the 
named plaintiff’s claim varies from some class members in a significant way.148 For instance, 
plaintiffs in Gayle v. Warden sought to certify a class of § 1226(c) detainees, asserting that the 
form they were provided upon entry to detention was inadequate notice of their right to a Joseph 
classification hearing, and the procedures in those hearings violated due process.149 The court 
found that because the plaintiffs had received a different version of the form than current and 
future class members, they could not adequately represent the class on that issue.150 However, 
the plaintiffs were adequate to represent the class on the due process claims, and it did not matter 
that the representatives were all permanent residents while some class members lacked status, 
because the due process analysis did not turn on status.151  
Commonality and typicality are generally addressed together, and depend on the specific 
legal question being raised. One way the government argues commonality and typicality are not 
met is by saying differences regarding types of detention or status between class members (or 
between members and representatives) matter for the type of remedy a court can provide, but 
those challenges will be overcome when the injury, such as a procedure that violates due process, 
 
147 Id. (citing Dean v. Coughlin, 107 F.R.D. 331, 332-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)). 
148 See, e.g. Cabrera Diaz v. Hott, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 626 (“Respondents do not challenge petitioners' ability to 
satisfy the… adequacy requirements.”). Adequacy of class counsel is even less of a concern, since the plaintiffs that 
try to certify habeas classes always have lawyers, usually large impact litigation advocacy groups. See, e.g., Brito v. 
Barr, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 144 (D. Mass. 2019) (“conceding that the… adequacy of class counsel requirements are 
met”). 
149 Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188498 at *33 (D.N.J. 2017). 
150 Id. at *34. 
151 Id. at *55-56. 
24 | H a b e a s  C l a s s  A c t i o n s ,  D e c e m b e r  2 0 1 9  
 
is the same.152 Subclasses are also used if relief between members necessarily varies based on 
those differences.153 Unlike civil rights classes alleging discrimination, classes of detainees don’t 
face the same difficulty in showing “significant proof” of their common detention154—no one is 
disputing that they are detained or what the procedures are, only the legality of that detention.  
Much of the commonality analysis in these cases overlaps with certification under Rule 
23(b)(2), but Jennings added a new wrinkle to this prior pattern as well. Before reaching the 
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit had held although class members were held under each of the 
different detention schemes, that did not defeat commonality because they were all challenging 
prolonged detention that had lasted over six months—the legality of which formed the “issue at 
the heart of each class member's claim for relief.”155 The Court in Jennings didn’t discuss 
commonality directly, but it did ask the Ninth Circuit to reconsider whether certification was 
appropriate under 23(b)(2) in light of Dukes.156 Applying Dukes makes both commonality and 
23(b)(2) more difficult in prolonged detention classes post-Jennings.157 Now that the Court has 
overturned the statutory reading of those clauses, and due process is all that could entitle class 
members to a hearing following prolonged detention, it is possible that not all class members 
 
152 See, e.g. Brito v. Barr, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 149 (holding that differences between class members who had received 
a defective bond hearing and those who had not received a hearing did not defeat commonality because the burden 
allocation question was the same); Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188498 at 
*40 (“[E]ach proposed class member may have different facts underlying his or her immigration case and some may 
not prevail in arguing that they are not ‘properly included’ in a mandatory detention category, but every proposed 
class member is subject to the same allegedly unconstitutional Joseph standard and procedural deficiencies.”).  
153 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d at 1123 (“To the extent… that the differing statutes authorizing detention 
of the various class members will render class adjudication of class members' claims impractical… it may counsel 
the formation of subclasses.”).  
154 Cf. David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777, 792 (2016) (noting the difficulty of 
proving commonality with evidence for public interest classes after Dukes). 
155 See id. at 1122-23 (holding that the proposed class satisfied Rule 23); Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 
1066 (9th Cir. 2016) (recounting the procedural history of the Rodriguez cases).  
156 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 851-52.  
157 See Shah, supra note 72 (explaining the hurdle Jennings created for due process class claims). 
25 | H a b e a s  C l a s s  A c t i o n s ,  D e c e m b e r  2 0 1 9  
 
have “suffered the same injury.”158 Because due process may require a different outcome for 
each class member, there may no longer be “a single injunction or declaratory judgment would 
provide relief to each member of the class,” making certification under 23(b)(2) improper.159 
This has been a major difficulty for prolonged detention classes since then. On remand 
from Jennings, the Ninth Circuit also remanded the certification question to the district court, 
noting that the subclasses may need to be modified, but “certainly no process at all may be a 
common characteristic of each of the statutes at issue.”160 Likewise, the court in Reid v. Donelan 
declined to decertify a § 1226(c) prolonged detention class post-Jennings.161 It found 
commonality and typicality were met even in the absence of a bright-line statutory rule because 
“the class still presents the common threshold question of whether their detention after six 
months without a bail hearing or reasonableness review violates the Constitution. Even if the 
answer to that question is no, the class still meets the commonality requirement.”162 
In contrast, a district court that had previously certified a class of § 1225(b) immigrants 
detained over six months in Abdi v. Duke, decertified the class after Jennings.163 The court 
determined that the now-invalidated statutory interpretation requiring bond hearings at six 
months “was the linchpin to the Court's conclusion that individualized bond hearings could be 
applied across-the-board to each putative class member….”164 It rejected the argument that due 
 
158 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349-350 (2011) (citing General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. 
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982). 
159 Id. at 360. 
160 Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d at 255. 
161 Reid v. Donelan, No. 13-30125, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181700 (D. Mass. Oct. 23, 2018). 
162 Id. at *14-16 (summary judgement granted in part, Reid v. Donelan, 390 F. Supp. 3d 201 (D. Mass. 2019). The 
petitioners suggested the government should conduct a reasonableness review every six months, rather than force 
each detainee to litigate that reasonableness through habeas, but the court ultimately disagreed. Reid v. Donelan, 390 
F. Supp. at 220-21.  
163 Abdi v. McAleenan, No. 1:17-cv-00721 EAW, 2019 WL 4621898 (W.D.N.Y. Sep. 24, 2019). 
164 Id. at *16 (internal citations omitted).  
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process alone required bond hearings after six months.165 Because the due process analysis 
would need to be individualized, it held the class no longer satisfied commonality or 23(b)(2).166  
Although Rule 23(b)(2) is the natural and most popular choice for habeas classes 
challenging legal aspects of immigration detention,167 they can also be certified under 
23(b)(1)(A) and (B). For example, Hernandez certified the class under 23(b)(1)(A) and (B), as 
well as (b)(2), because of the risk that individual petitions asserting a constitutional requirement 
to consider ability to pay in bond hearings could result in inconsistent adjudications on that 
question, which would create conflicting directives for immigration judges, and would affect 
nonparties subject to that same practice.168 Certification under 23(b)(1) might provide a way 
around the problem of whether any legal determination regarding due process could provide 
relief to an entire class in the prolonged detention classes following Jennings. Even if flexible 
concepts of due process might not require a bond hearing at six months, individual petitions 
might result in inconsistent adjudications that require immigration judges to take different 
actions in similar circumstances. Those determinations could be dispositive of nonparties’ 
interests in similar cases—and would disproportionately leave petitioners that cannot afford 
counsel or file a pro-se habeas petition without any protections at all.  
III. Conclusion: The Importance of Habeas Class Actions in Immigration Detention 
Whether a habeas class can overcome the above obstacles will depend on the specific 
legal issue and the class definition. But despite the difficulties, the need for large-scale litigation 
is clear. Immigration detention affects a record number of individuals every year, and its moral 
 
165 Id. at *22-23 (“While certain principles arising out of criminal jurisprudence may be somewhat analogous to civil 
immigration detention, the cases relied upon by Petitioners do not compel the conclusion that a six-month bright-line 
rule is mandated by the Constitution.”). 
166 Id. at *33. 
167 See, e.g., Brito v. Barr, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 149 (certifying the class under 23(b)(2)). 
168 Hernandez v. Lynch, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191881 at *56-58. 
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and economic costs are devasting.169 In fiscal year 2018, almost 400,000 people were booked 
into ICE custody, and over 240,000 into Customs and Border Patrol custody.170 The Department 
of Homeland Security has come under fire for abysmal conditions in detention centers, including 
by its own Inspector General, which has reported on overcrowding, spoiled food, a lack of basic 
hygiene materials, unjustified strip searches, and abuse of solitary confinement in detention 
facilities.171 Medical care is frequently delayed or inadequate,172 with at least 24 immigrants 
dying in U.S. custody during the Trump administration alone, including seven children.173 And 
despite being civil in name, “detention promotes beliefs among detainees that the legal system is 
punitive,… that legal rules are inscrutable by design, and that legal outcomes are arbitrary.”174  
Habeas class actions are a necessary backstop against these excesses and arbitrary 
executive detention of immigrants. They provide one of the few ways to challenge the complex 
immigration detention scheme in a uniform manner, particularly given the barriers to habeas 
relief for the vast majority of detainees, the ever-expanding size of immigration detention, and 
the aggressive Congressional restriction of judicial review. Courts should exercise their power to 
hear habeas class actions consistent with the principles behind both habeas corpus and Rule 23. 
 
169 See Manning & Stumpf, supra note 1 at 415 (“Aggregating the number of people detained in connection with 
civil immigration proceedings and those incarcerated for immigration-related crimes results in a big number: over 
half a million individuals in custodial facilities.”); Detention by the Numbers, FREEDOM FOR IMMIGRANTS, 
https://www.freedomforimmigrants.org/detention-statistics (last visited Dec. 2, 2019) (providing data on the costs of 
detention, which are nearly $150 per person per day in some states, and primarily benefit private detention 
companies). 
170 Kate Sullivan & Jeff Mason, Immigration Detention in the United States: A Primer, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER 
(Apr. 24, 2019) https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/immigration-detention-in-the-united-states-a-primer/.  
171 Priscilla Alvarez, DHS Watchdog Finds Expired Food, Dilapidated Bathrooms Amid ‘Egregious’ Conditions at 
ICE Facilities in 2018, CNN (June 7, 2019) https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/06/politics/ice-detention-center-ig-
report/index.html.  
172 See generally CODE RED: THE FATAL CONSEQUENCES OF DANGEROUSLY SUBSTANDARD MEDICAL CARE IN 
IMMIGRATION DETENTION, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 2018), available at: https://www.aclu.org/report/code-red-
fatal-consequences-dangerously-substandard-medical-care-immigration-detention.  
173 Madeleine Joung, What is Happening at Migrant Detention Centers? Here’s What to Know, TIME (July 12, 2019) 
https://time.com/5623148/migrant-detention-centers-conditions/. 
174 Ryo, supra note 22 at 108. 
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Allowing habeas class actions is consistent with the principles behind Rule 23 class 
actions. They promote judicial economy, especially as immigration detention grows 
exponentially. Class actions in the immigration detention context also promote basic fairness to 
the detainees, who often lack English proficiency, cannot afford a lawyer, are isolated from 
support systems, and are unfamiliar with the U.S. legal system.175 Expecting each detainee to 
challenge his or her detention through an individual habeas petition is patently unrealistic, and 
would flood the courts if it did happen. The modern version of Rule 23 was designed in the 
1960s with civil rights class actions in mind.176 As the cases above show, immigration detention 
class actions address civil rights issues such as discrimination on the basis of poverty, conditions 
of detention, and due process protections. As such, they fit squarely within the model of public 
interest impact litigation that “evolve[d] in lockstep” with the class action.177  
Similarly, allowing habeas class actions in the immigration detention context is consistent 
with the principles behind habeas. As the Supreme Court said in St. Cyr, “At its historical core, 
the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, 
and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.”178 As recent years have shown, 
the operation of immigration detention is largely subject to the whims of the executive.179 And 
no matter how long it lasts, or which statute authorizes it, it is a restriction of liberty in every 
sense, in which detainees are confined to jails for months or years at a time if they exercise their 
right to pursue immigration relief. Habeas class actions in the immigration detention context thus 
 
175 See Marouf, supra note 44 at 2150-51 (describing the how detention inflicts financial, physical, and emotional 
hardship, as well as makes it difficult to successfully pursue relief); Ryo, supra note 22 at 105 (describing 
difficulties for non-English and non-Spanish speaking inmates). 
176 Marcus, supra note 154 at 783. 
177 Marcus, supra note 154 at 783, 785. 
178 I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301. 
179 See generally SARAH PIERCE, IMMIGRATION-RELATED POLICY CHANGES IN THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE TRUMP 
ADMINISTRATION, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (May 2019), available at: 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-policy-changes-two-years-trump-administration. 
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provide an invaluable tool for protecting liberty and ensuring due process for the tens of 
thousands of people detained by the executive branch every day.   
